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Abstract
The competitive market structure of a decentralized economy is con-
verted into a self-policing system treating the bureaucracy and enforce-
ment of the legal system endogenously. In particular we consider money
systems as constructs to make agents’ economic strategies predictable
from knowledge of their preferences and endowments, and thus to sup-
port coordinated resource production and distribution from independent
decision making. Diverse rule systems can accomplish this, and we con-
struct minimal strategic market games representing government-issued
fiat money and ideal commodity money as two cases. We endogenize the
provision of money and rules for its use as productive activities within the
society, and consider the problem of transition from generalist to specialist
production of subsistence goods as one requiring economic coordination
under the support of a money system to be solved. The scarce resource in
a society is labor limited by its ability to coordinate (specifically, calling
for the expenditure of time and effort on communication, computation,
and control), which must be diverted from primary production either to
maintain coordinated group activity, or to provide the institutional ser-
vices supporting decentralized trade. Social optima are solutions in which
the reduced costs of individual decision making against rules (relative to
maintenance of coalitions) are larger than the costs of the institutions pro-
viding the rules, and in which the costs of the institutions are less than
the gains from the trade they enable to take place.
1 Introduction: institutional foundations of the
decentralized economy
The general equilibrium system is usually presented without institutional or
strategic context. Here a game theoretic structure is provided that converts the
competitive model into a self-policing system where a bureaucracy polices the
laws of the economy to limit the strategic manipulation of the agents in the
∗We adopt the convention that in joint work the order of appearance of names on the
publication should be selected randomly unless there is a specific stated reason otherwise. We
have acted accordingly.
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economy. The economy is modeled as a strategic market game. As there is
considerable notation, a table is provided in App. B for referential convenience.
The deepest formal distinction one can make in the modeling of a society is
whether the primitive strategic actors are individuals or groups1. Since Adam
Smith’s emphasis on the surprising coordinating effects of independent, self-
interested action [1], the mathematical formalization of economic theory has
progressively narrowed to the problem of associating algorithms for disaggre-
gated decision making with observed or desired distributions of resources. Yet
the actions of governments and firms are essentially strategies carried out by
the managers of institutions, or aggregates of agents, or coalitions2, and these
strategies implement the rules against which individuals act as members of the
decentralized economy. The basic structure of economic life, as well as many
specific observable regularities, thus cannot emerge solely from the action of
individuals against rule systems, but must be understood from the interactions
of the decentralized economy with its centralized supporting institutions.
1.1 Problems that require the treatment of institutions
In this and a companion paper we seek to understand the following specific ques-
tions, as well as to define a functional framework within which the institutional
origins and economic roles of structurally different moneys can be understood
and compared:
First, what sets the natural scale of government as a support for anony-
mous markets? A recognized weakness of General Equilibrium analysis is its
somewhat amorphous assumption of “costlessly enforceable contracts” [2]. In
economies with fiat money, the government is the institutional enforcer of con-
tracts, and a large part of the cost of contract enforcement is the economic
cost of running the government. More fundamentally, government is the de-
finer of many forms of contract in the economy, and of other non-contractual
“rules of the game” [3]. Presumably there are criteria for optimizing its size and
acceptable cost in terms of what those rules make possible.
Second, what determines the value of fiat money in trade for real goods,
and what is the interpretation of that value within its own rule system? A
progression from commoditiy moneys (such as salt or tea), to metals by weight
or in ingot form, to coins with a state’s seal, selling over commodity value,
to fiat [4], and even to abstract systems of account, can be seen in culturally
diverse societies. Possible reasons why such a progression is favored are that
fiat frees materials of utilitarian value from being sequestered as moneys rather
than used otherwise [5], or that it provides additional regulatory controls over
the macroeconomy. These features depend on its intrinsic near-valuelessness,
but are only realized if its valuation in real goods is stable and predictable.
Expectations models of fiat valuation [6] suggest some short-term bounds on its
change, but longer-term stability must be institutional in origin.
1In our society two types of legal persons are considered, natural and corporate persons.
2These are coalitions within governments or firms, with the institution as a whole acting as
the grand coalition that establishes the rules for the games that define its particular function.
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A third question motivated by historical succession of moneys is what re-
lation different stages have to each other. Is gold with a king’s stamp a pure
commodity money? Is fiat intrinsically a debt contract for gold, or is it an
instrument within a system defined by quite independent rules, and do debt
contracts merely provide a mechanism for the orderly transition from a material
substrate? Answering these conceptual questions requires an understanding of
the barriers to trade, and of the independent ways structurally different money
systems define protocols to overcome the same barriers. The physical charac-
teristics that make a commodity a “good” commodity money need not have
anything intrinsic to do with the nature of money; they need only be tailored
to requirements for commodity-mediated signals.
1.2 The functional roles of money and its supports
In this and a companion essay we introduce two strategic market games [4]
constructed to provide the strategies and signals needed to make specialization
rational. In the first, an endogenously formed government distributes fiat money,
so that its flow from government salaries to taxation supports trade in private
markets for all goods, while simultaneously providing a rational strategy for a
subset of agents to man the government rather than produce privately. The
enforcement of tax liabilities ties fiat to government-induced penalties, making
“tax relief” a utilitarian service purchased with fiat, and thus stabilizing the
numéraire relative to consumables, along the basic lines argued by Knapp [7].
Rather than leave implicit how agents are subject to tax liabilities, in the spirit of
implementing a fully decentralized system we introduce central-bank lending as
the only source of fiat in the private sector before trade has begun, and initiate
taxation on trade together with interest charges on borrowing. The interest
mechanism to stabilize fiat value has been used in models without endogenous
government [4], where the distribution of money was not tied to any individual’s
action and was a pure device to support trade.
The strategic market game with fiat introduces an explicit institutional cost
from the creation of government, whose input is labor and whose output is de-
termined by technologies for enforcing default penalties on the supervising of
central-bank loans and their repayment. Thus contracts have a specific opera-
tional meaning, and the extra-social cost of their enforcement is institutionally
represented. Fiat money emerges as the source of the basic contracts in society,
without itself being a contract for anything 3 .
In the second second essay, a second strategic market game is presented.
This game omits the institutional cost of government by using the durable com-
modity as money, between the time when it is produced and the time when it
is consumed by manufacture to yield utilitarian services. The essential element
of pre-commitment that gives fiat its signaling value has a counterpart for com-
modity money, which is the cost of acquiring it and the demand for its utility,
which agents know4. Idealized commodities, however, do not require separate
3We can argue that it is a null contract. It promises to pay $1 for $1.
4or at least, in real societies can often estimate.
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and costly institutions to give them this signal, because it is assumed that their
worth can be judged by individuals independently at the point of trade5. In the
act of exchange, however, commodities are a physical “store of value”, which
imprints any discounting of the future on the spot interest rate for all goods,
inducing trade inefficiencies that have labor-equivalent costs.
1.3 The costs of centralized and decentralized coordina-
tion
The rules for trading, apart from those related to stabilizing money, are essen-
tially dummy institutions in these models. They are formal rules not costing
labor to provide and are given as invariants of all the games. The government
is modeled only as the aggregation of agents who adopt contract enforcement
as a livelihood. In this form, the problem of optimal labor allocation and trade
could almost be viewed as a process-oriented elaboration of a General Equilib-
rium problem of optimal production and consumption (apart from the absence
of contracts to enforce in Equilibrium analysis). In the second essay, we use
such a reduction in the goods sector to define natural efficiency measures for
the distribution of labor and subsequently of goods in each of the market games,
which assigns value to the trading systems themselves.
However, this highly encapsulating representation of government should not
be understood to mean that the problems of cooperative action have been re-
placed with noncooperative ones in a closed system. Rather, the costs of forming
coalitions and obtaining coherent strategic action from the individuals that are
their members are so high that they would be unaffordable for direct economic
coordination throughout the society, and this cost is the barrier to large-scale
coordination through cooperative mechanisms6. These same costs are present
in microcosm in the internal workings of government, and are responsible for its
consumption of labor. The task for more elaborate models is to derive them ex-
plicitly. The important feature of the government/economy interface is that the
bureaucratic, institutional or coalition strategies within the government build
generative rule and signaling systems for low-cost independent decision making;
their generative character is the “invisible hand” sent forth from the visible
institutional interface. The government itself is thus only affordable if it is a
small fraction of the economy’s size7, and innovation in government (as in firms)
5It is something of a misnomer to call this “costless”. Rather, commodity money exploits
mechanisms of verification that have evolved within the society for other reasons. Their
availability is an externality of other quite costly processes, but ones whose costs would be
paid in the course of exchange of the commodities as goods anyway, and have no separate
institutional account.
6As an example consider tax evasion. Tax compliance takes place by noncooperative deci-
sions against the tax laws, and the transaction itself is a small economic burden. Tax evasion
(in the sense of complete defection), while feasible on sufficiently large scale as a coalition
strategy, is not served by any similar rules for coordinated decentralized action. This is pre-
sumably an important part of the reason it does not occur.
7In year 2000 government employment in the United States was around 15.7% of the work
force (SAUS, 2001, Table 607).
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consists of the transfer of successively more functions from coalition-based mech-
anisms to decentralized market-supporting rule systems8.
In this framework of modeling and interpretation, the succession of moneys
is “explained” if it produces a synergy: government and fiat survive when they
can improve the utility of trade or the efficiency of production by more than their
cost of providing rules and signals as outputs of an internal coalition structure.
Both the costs that make non-market coordination infeasible and the costs to
implement markets have many of the same underlying causes.
1.4 Layout of the papers
In Sec. 2 we discuss the problem of transition to specialist production, and
the game-theoretic representation of barriers to trade. In Sec. 3 we define the
requirements on money systems in terms of signaling and predictability, and
distinguish the ways these are provided by different institutional forms. Sec. 4
begins formal modeling, with the characterization of society and the invariants
from which different moneys will be compared. Sec. 5 defines a game for the
formation of government, and analyzes the problems of limiting strategic default
in endogenously optimized markets, and their consequences for the natural size
of government. Sec. 1 of the second essay defines an alternative game for use
of commodity money, and Sec. 2 introduces natural money-metric valuation for
the money system, comparing the models in both essays.
2 Specialization as a quintessential coordination
problem
The ability of a society to specialize in its production of goods is a paradigm
coordination problem within which to define the economic guidance goals of
government and to study the functions of moneys. It is sufficiently general to
be abstracted across societies and periods of history, and sufficiently central to
survival and growth to be robust against quibbles about utilitarian representa-
tion [8] of people’s needs9. The utilitarian representation of specialization as a
robust problem is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Specialization in the production of subsistence goods potentially captures
economies of scale, increasing the level of consumption for everyone. However,
specialization realistically requires a livelihood choice, with a committed time
period between the abandonment of generalist production and the output of
surplus of a single good. Historically the transformation from autarchy or near
8The other activity of coalitions within government is the definition, in a self-referential
way, of the structure and strategies of the other coalitions in government. How this can be
done is an important and deep problem at the interface of government with the social and
cognitive substructures of society.
9Much of nutrition can be reduced to shared human biochemistry, and the growth or
attrition of populations provides evolutionary measures of their success which may in some
cases be substituted for intentionality.
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autarchy has been an emergent process occuring over a long run. The com-
mitment to specialize creates a risk for the potential specialist, who forfeits
subsistence production of many goods, and can only benefit from surplus of one
good in a society with complementary specialists and markets that efficiently
support their redistribution. The problem for the specialist is predicting the
production and trade strategies of the other individuals in society, which in
general he can neither learn nor enforce.
Game theoretically the commitment of specialization is represented by con-
currency and independence in the strategic choice of livelihood. If a mecha-
nism for trade is not specified, the absence of an associated post-production
economic strategy set is equivalent to a cost for all trading strategies greater
than any in the production move of the game. Possible costs of non-money
coordination mechanisms can be those of negotiating division of labor and en-
suring non-defection, which are essentially costs of communication and control.
Alternatively, as in the Walrasian auction – the closest representation of a pro-
cess model whose output is the General Equilibrium allocation – the costs are
for communication of whole demand curves from all agents, computation of
equilibria (when those are computable [11]), and delivery of goods (control).
Interestingly, the nominally institution-free General Equilibrium algorithm is
associated with one of the more costly process models. (Empirical estimates
of the cost-limitations on the scale of trade that can be managed in something
like the Walrasian manner can perhaps be inferred from modern state-managed
centralized economies, accounting for differences if agents cannot define their
own preferences).
When money-metric values are assigned to outcomes with trade relative to
those without, the time and effort needed for communication, computation, and
control become scarce resources on an equal footing with factors of production of
consumable goods, whose marginal utility is the marginal value of trade. Models
of economic organization that incorporate centralizing bodies generalize the idea
of optimal distribution under conditions of scarcity to include the allocation of
this effort, and consistently represent trade as part of the productive apparatus
of the society.
3 Money and predictability
The essential requirement for a post-production trade algorithm is that agents
be able to estimate each other’s rational strategies for livelihood choice and
market activity, based on knowledge of production technologies, labor supply,
and agent preferences. Bounds on available or rational strategies are represented
in decentralized markets as bounds on the use of money. Therefore the defining
requirement of a money and credit system is that its use in the markets by each
agent be tied by some form of pre-commitment to either the production activities
or utilities of that agent, which are generally known or can be estimated.
Mechanistically, commodity moneys and fiat separate according to the type
of precommitment they employ. Commodities to be used as money are obtained
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at the expense of spot consumption of other goods, and a knowledge of what
stock of goods other agents are capable of producing (and of their preferences)
allows an estimation of their money supply and strength in the markets. While
consumption utility provides the salvage value for commodities to resolve the
Hahn paradox for their intermediate money value [12], part of the marginal
utility of commodities at the point of purchase is the shadow price of their
release of constraints on future trade10, and the other part is the discounted
future utility of consumption.
Government issue ties the posession of fiat to penalties such as tax or interest
liability, and through this, ties the marginal posession of fiat to the marginal
utility of default relative to consumption11. The ability of government to rule
out (or at least limit) strategic default is the necessary condition to tie the
money supply and hence the scale of bids to an initial numéraire, such as the
injection through government salaries.
3.1 Trust, displaced trust, or trust substitutes
The degree to which an agent’s strategic action supposes predictability of other
strategies that are not directly controlled could be called a measure of trust12.
Institutional supports for decentralized markets can be characterized as either
augmenting or displacing trust, or creating trust substitutes.
Monetization of personal credit is an instance of trust augmentation, through
mechanisms of reputation frequently supported by coercion [13], which are po-
tentially costly and limited in scope, and which we do not consider. Fiat money
displaces trust from agent intentions onto the government’s ability to stabilize
the supply and value of money. This displacement is a network effect, arising
from greater ease of information-gathering for fewer and more visible agencies.
Trust substitutes are provided by institutional rules or social norms like cash
payment, which limit agents’ strategy sets to their available offers of money.
Ideal commodity money is a pure trust substitute, while fiat appears as a trust
substitute within the trading subgame, but a mechanism to displace trust in
the larger game of adopting monetary and fiscal policy.
3.2 Minimal models
As in the functional taxonomy of one-period markets [10], our concern is with
minimal models defined by criteria of strategic freedom, constraint, and symme-
try, which formalize barriers to trade and the trust mechanisms that overcome
10In a basic way the economics of finance and trust calls for the mathematics of inequalities
which is generally more difficult than the mathematical economics of equalities primarily
encountered.
11Thus we see that when the value of commodities cannot actually be judged costlessly at
the point of trade, and a king’s stamp ensures weight and composition – along with threat of
punishment for defacement – the money is not pure commodity but a hybrid of elements of
commodity and fiat. See also discussion in Ref. [4].
12This use of trust concerns only predictability, and does not include other connotations of
good faith.
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them. We define hierarchical extensive game forms, in which the outer move
is the adoption of a money system and the commitment to production strate-
gies, and the inner move is trade of surplus. The hierarchical structure of the
game is recapitulated in its temporal structure: livelihood choices are fixed
over episodes, within which a large number of production and trade periods
take place. We define models that allow an arbitrary separation of these two
timescales, to reflect the fact that the adoption of government structure and
money, or of livelihood, is a more costly process than trade itself, happening
much less frequently, and generating information about the structure of society
which is available to agents as input to their trading strategies. In deterministic
models with stationary solutions the ratio of scales does not affect underlying
“physical” observables such as prices or optimal allocations, but in models with
stochastic endowments and money markets, it would be expected to affect the
ability of either government or social norms to stabilize the values of either
fiat or commodity moneys, probably transferring much of the determination of
short-term valuation onto expectations [6].
We idealize the problem of specialization to produce an extreme m-dimensional
version of Jevons’s failure of the double coincidence of wants [14], and make pref-
erences symmetric under permutation of non-durable consumption goods13, to
study the symmetry properties of the money systems themselves. In each model,
we minimize the number of strategic degrees of freedom representing each neces-
sary institution. We formalize a general problem of intertemporal utilities with
durable as well as non-durable consumption goods, so that fiat and commodity
monies can be compared quantitatively, but the durable commodity is defined
in such a way that a regular limit decouples it from strategies concerning point
consumables14. In this limit the time periods become independent, and the
models of fiat may be compared under an identical efficiency measure to models
in the one-period taxonomy [10], in which the rules of the game were exogenous
and their costs were not considered.
4 Game-theoretic formulation: the invariants of
society
We generally utilize strategic market games to ensure a well-defined process
model with specified strategies and consequences, irrespective of endowments or
other factors that may constrain agents’ access to them, or preferences that may
bias their use. Implicit in this prioritization is a presumption that endowments
are more variable, and preference models more questionable, than the observable
institutional structure of a society [15, 10].
Our concern here, though, is how the stability or succession of money systems
may be explained by their costs and satisfaction of needs for trade, in societies
13We consider a non-durable good to be a point-consumption good.
14We consider that a consumable is consumed at a point in time, whereas durables provide
a stream of services over an interval.
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otherwise constrained by productive potential, and having enough stability of
preferences for basic needs of life to make different institutional structures com-
parable, as suggested in Fig. 1. This requires casting preferences and certain
technologies that lead to endowment as primary, and the strategy spaces that
mediate those as subject to variation. Such a view of society is probably not
applicable to most aspects of luxury consumption or very long timescales, but
we suppose it is an acceptable description of basic subsistence needs over time
scales shorter than those of biological or deep social adaptation. We therefore
introduce a minimal structure of agents, time, goods, production technology,
and preferences, within which the rules of various institutions make domains of
strategic action available, and from which the institutions themselves may be
assigned utilitarian values.
4.1 Agents, time, goods, technology, preferences
We introduce a collection S of n initially indistinguishable agents called a so-
ciety, m + 1 primary production goods indexed j ∈ 0, . . . ,m, and time within
an episode having discrete periods of length t0. We assume the money system
and rules of government are fixed for the episode, and at time t = 0 agents
commit to livelihoods. In each period indexed t = kt0 production, trade, and
consumption occur. Good j = 0 is a durable which we think of as gold, and
goods j ∈ 1, . . . ,m are nondurable consumables (corn, beans, squash) that ex-
pire if not consumed within the period in which they are produced. Gold is not
of utilitarian value in itself, but may be used as an input to the creation of some
form of capital stock (tooth fillings, braclets or electronic devices, etc.), which
yields services of utilitarian value in proportion to the amount of the capital
stock agents hold at the beginning of each period. This modeling choice allows
gold to be an ideal durable which may or may not be used as a commodity
money. The combination of utilitarian value of capital stock, and the finite la-
bor cost of replacing gold that has exited the system, provides the salvage value
for gold as a commodity money.
Associated with the jth primary production good is a specialist production
technology, which any agent may adopt and which yields an endowment ajt0
of that good to the agent in each period, and none of any other goods. Thus
we think of the production rate aj as primary, and the periodization of produc-
tion, trade, and consumption as independently determinable. For notational
simplicity we suppose that the nondurable consumables are measurable in some
equivalent unit (bushels), and to study the symmetry properties of money sys-
tems we take all production rates aj = a, j ∈ 1, . . . ,m as in Ref. [10], and
a0 ≡ e0 (an “extraction” rate for gold from nature). The specialist production
functions are mutually exclusive (each agent can adopt at most one), and as a
null model for a society without money or markets, we nominally consider a gen-
eralist production technology yielding some equal rates of production ε ¿ a/m
of each nondurable consumable, and ε0 of gold.
We make the formal simplification of ruling out the individual choice for
generalist (or autarkic) production in the games studied because in an advanced
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economy within a social structure maximal specialization always characterizes
solutions to games offering both, if specialization appears at all15.
In addition to specialist technologies for primary production, we consider a
specialist technology for the production of contract enforcement, which yields
some measure π per individual per period per numéraire fiat, whose meaning is
made precise within the context of the games where it appears. The membership
n of S represents a labor constraint, which together with the m + 1 primary
production technologies and the technology for contract enforcement define the
productive potential of society. For arithmetic convenience we set |S| = n = mr,
where r is some integer. In type-symmetric solutions, r will be a replication
index for full suites of production of the nondurable consumable goods.
In all games, the first move of the extensive form, occuring once per episode,
will be the adoption by each agent of a production technology (a livelihood),
and we denote by νj number of individuals who elect to produce the jth good in
that episode, and by ν̄ the number who specialize in contract enforcement. It is
convenient to name type j = 0 producers prospectors, types j ∈ 1, . . . ,m farm-
ers, and the contract enforcers bureaucrats, and to distinguish all bureaucrat
parameters and variables with overbars.
As in Ref. [10], all agents are taken to have identical preferences, expressed
as utility functions of their allocations of the nondurable consumables at the end
of each period’s trade, and of the utility of capital stock held at the beginning of
the period (so that it effectively delivers its services through the period)16. This
final allocation of good j to any producer i in period t is denoted Aji,tt0, and
to any bureaucrat k in period t is denoted Ājk,tt0. Initial endowments a
j
i,tt0 are
defined for all producers to make equations uniform, but take only values zero
or ajt0 as appropriate. The capital stock held by i at the beginning of period t
is denoted Ci,t, and that held by k is denoted C̄k,t.
4.2 Stock and flow variables
We are careful to distinguish stock from flow variables because, in the dimen-
sional analysis of these systems, defining a quantity in terms of a flow carries
with it scaling consequences as we take the period under which the flow is
accumulated to zero (in this case, the trading day length t0). In particular,
we represent utilities as functions of rates of consumption17, in which ρD is a







15Historically there have been hermits and communes who have opted out of the greater
specialist economy for the “simpler life”, but these are of minor significance.
16This modeling choice is not interpreted as an assertion that all individuals in a real society
are interchangeable, but as a diagnostic of the ability of the markets to produce trade without
structurally introducing asymmetries.
17One can snack all day or eat a few large meals; the criterion of being well-fed depends on
the rates of intake relative to metabolic needs not set by the economy.
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ρDUi,t and ρDŪk,t may be thought of as flow-valued utility rates. As long as
they are defined in terms of rates of consumption Aji,t, Ā
j
k,t, and production a
j
i,t,
and we define the period discount factor 1/β ≡ 1+ρDt0, the accumulations (1,2)












−ρDt = 1 (by the Euler formula for
the exponential as i → ∞ for any fixed time t). For stationary solutions the
discounted utilities Ui, Ūk approach the values of Ui,t or Ūk,t attained in steady
state. A characteristic of commodity money is that if it is in sufficient supply,
ρD also becomes the spot rate, while for fiat moneys the spot rate ρ is specified
independently.














































Υ is a dimensional tracking parameter for utility19, whose meaning will be
defined when we introduce default penalties. We reference consumption rates
to production rates, and stocks Ci,t and C̄k,t of the durable good to amounts
produced at rate e0 within a discount horizon 1/ρD.
The parameter s scales the rate of marginal utility obtained from services
from capital stock relative to that from rates of consumption. When s → 0
there is no salvage value to resolve the Hahn paradox for commodity money,
but with fiat money the periods are decoupled and the time structure may be
ignored. In general we solve for s 6= 0 in order to compare the costs related to
discounting and spot interest rates under different money systems.
18This cardinalization of the Cobb-Douglas utility has the feature that the algebraic first-
order conditions exactly match their dimensional estimates in continuum limits. This form
was used also in the minimal models of Refs. [10].
19In other words, to claim that cardinal utilities may be compared for scale against some
quantities (particularly bankruptcy penalties as we define them below) but not others, it is
necessary to assign a scaling dimension to the comparable quantities, which we will name
“util”. Υ is a carrier of that dimension, such as a formal scale factor “1 util”, which relates
the (dimensionless) logarithms to other quantities that set scales for utility.
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4.3 Trade, investment, and decay of capital stock
We impose as further invariants on all models the mechanism of one-period
trade, and a specification for carry-over and decay of capital stock across pe-
riods. These will permit comparison of fiat and commodity moneys, without
consideration of changes in market structure that could be invented to accom-
pany them.
All trade uses a one-period bid-offer game [4, 10] with cash payment and no
credit. Any producer i offers good j in amount qji,t, and cash bids in amount
bji,t, at a unique trading post for good j at the beginning of trade in period t.
Offers satisfy 0 ≤ qji,t ≤ a
j
i,tt0, (hence zero unless i has adopted the production
technology for good j). Any bureaucrat k by construction is not a primary
producer, and is limited to bids b̄jk,t. Constraints on bids depend on the money
system, and are specified together with the extensive form of each game as it













i,t. Bids scale with the money supply, which
is a stock variable, while rates of offer scale with rates of production, which
are flows. This causes prices and the velocity of money to depend on the trade
period t0, though the stationary equilibrium allocation of real goods does not.
Bids and offers are simultaneous and independent among agents within each



















Cash in the amount qji,tp
j
t is returned to producer i from each post j, and nothing
is returned from posts to bureaucrats.
Gold can be converted to capital stock, at various times depending on the
game considered. In all cases we denote by σi,tt0 the amount converted by
producer i within period t, and by σ̄k,tt0 the amount converted by bureaucrat
k. (Thus σi,t and σ̄k,t are rates of conversion.) Converted gold does not appear
as utilitarian capital stock until the beginning of the next period, and a fraction
∆t0 ≤ 1 of the beginning capital stock from the previous period also vanishes
20.
(∆ is a continuum rate of decay.) The carry-forward equation for i from these
two effects is
Ci,t+t0 = (1 − ∆t0) Ci,t + σi,tt0, (7)
and for k is
C̄k,t+t0 = (1 − ∆t0) C̄k,t + σ̄k,tt0. (8)
20Our industrial exit route is a simplified proxy for diverse processes, such as theft, depre-
ciation, or export.
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Capital stock is thus measured in terms of the amount of gold required to create
it21.
5 Endogenously formed government and fiat money
5.1 Extensive form and money supply
We associate with the technology of contract enforcement some (for convenience,
durable, costlessly produced) fiat money22, which the government can distribute
to and collect from agents, denominated in some unit for the fiat. Contract
enforcement is represented as some method of control by which government can
directly influence the utility of agents, defining a form of generalized penalty.
Specifically, we represent the power of the bureaucracy as a ratio π mapping
any level of default in fiat to a disutility directly comparable to the utilities
Ui,t, Ūk,t of rates of consumption. The dimensionality and scale of π only
become meaningful when we know the money supply that sets the scale for
potential default by any agent. Alternatively, the meaning and dimensions
of “utility” are operationally defined through the disutility associated with the
default penalty. Government is defined by the existence of contract enforcement
and spot markets for all goods (including gold) accepting bids in fiat. An
identical multiperiod game structure has the following moves:
1. At the beginning of the episode, each agent chooses a production function,




, which are then made common knowledge.
A taxation function of the livelihood distribution is specified as part of
the rules of the game, which agents therefore also know. Its specific form
is given in terms of trade below.
2. A sequence of periods, which for convenience we take to be infinite23 are
then repeated, subordinate to the labor allocation. In each period each
bureaucrat is issued µ̄t0 units of fiat, and each producer receives the en-
dowment ajt0 of the appropriate good. µ̄ is the salary rate of bureaucratic
employment, defined independent of the length of trading period.
3. Once endowments have been assigned, all agents are eligible to borrow
fiat from a central bank at a prespecified rate of interest ρ, with principle
and interest ∝ ρt0 repayable to the bank in the last move of the period.
gi,t denotes the amount borrowed by producer i, and ḡk,t by bureaucrat
k. (Any of gi,t or ḡk,t may be negative
24, though this option is not used
in the solutions found here.)
21In industrial uses gold may be lost, or subject to wear. If the economy is deemed to be
open, i.e. set in the context of international trade, gold may flow out or in. We do not consider
the latter possibility here.
22In fact in 2004 it cost 4.5 cents per note for $1 and $2 bills and 8.7 cents per note for the
new color currency (Treasury website information).
23Practically speaking, this requires only that the largest t À 1/ρD .
24i.e., deposit instead of borrowing
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4. Fiat and goods are then traded by the rules of Sec. 4.3. The constraint








k,t ≤ µ̄t0 + ḡk,t














to permit agents to optimize trade within each period, and then
as a function of the resulting distribution, to optimize the labor allocation
in the outer move of the game.
Trading-post disbursements are the revenue of the producers, and it is nat-
ural to regard taxes collected as the revenue of the bureaucrats, distributed




5. We avoid an unnecessary inequality (always saturated in solutions to
games with this preference structure and fiat money) and its associated
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, by writing into the rules of the game that all gold
purchased in the markets is converted to capital stock in the same period.
Thus the rates σi,t = A
0
i,t and σ̄k,t = Ā
0
k,t in each period.
6. In the last move of the period, agents repay principle and interest to the
central bank, and taxes to the government, and are assessed any penalties
for underpayment. We have all agents return all fiat in their posessions
(again to simplify the algebra by removing an unnecessary additional re-
payment variable and inequality constraint). Thus all fiat issued through
either salaries or loans is recollected at the end of the period (though that
may not be all that is owed, if agents borrow and spend into default).




i,t, and for a





Producers collectively recover all principle they borrow through the trad-
ing posts, while bureaucrats collectively recover all taxes they owe through
taxation revenue. The balance between bureaucrat spending into the pri-
vate sector to cover its taxes and interest, and the flow back of tax revenue
to cover bureaucrat principle, determines the labor equilibrium between
the private and public sectors. Ultimately it is possible to find strategies in
which each individual’s principle liability is covered by market revenue at
any level of borrowing, so that only the net flow from government salaries
to interest (both proportional to t0 in any period) determines the money
supply.
This game is a straightforward process-oriented extension of the way one
might incorporate contract enforcement into a General Equilibrium model, as
an output of production whose input is labor. Provision of the money supply,
like primary production of durable and nondurable goods, consumes the labor
of an endogenously optimized fraction of the population.
In stationary solutions, carry-forward of capital stock reduces its first-order
conditions to effectively independent decisions in the variables σi,t and σ̄k,t,
which appear simply as additional consumables. In the limit s → 0 gold pro-
duction is not adopted, permutation becomes a symmetry of all remaining goods
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and periods of trade decouple, so the trade efficiency of the society can be com-
pared to the minimal models in a one-period taxonomy without government.
Alternatively, at s 6= 0, utilitarian capital stock provides the salvage value to
resolve the Hahn paradox for gold, and the origins and magnitudes of cost of a
money system may be compared for commodity money and government fiat.
5.2 Budget constraint, default, and enforcement
The budget constraint on trade can be enforced by adding respectively to Ui,t
and Ūk,t Kuhn-Tucker terms









Ūk,t → Ūk,t + λ̄k,t








where the multipliers λi,t and λ̄k,t run from [0,∞), and are varied to minimize
Ui,t and Ūk,t by an imaginary adversary (the adversary has the interpretation
of a social norm such as cash payment enforcing the constraint, which we need
not model as an embodied institution or source of excess cost).
Producer i’s fiat at the end of borrowing and trading is











while bureaucrat k’s is























The liability for repayment of fiat at the end of the period is enforced by
adding to each utility a penalty function proportional to the unpaid debt and
to some intensity of enforcement. For producers, this may be written














where Π defines a linear map from default to utility, like the technology param-
eter π. The corresponding relation for bureaucrats is













We represent the labor limitation of the bureaucracy by specifying, as a rule of
the game, that the penalty Π is defined in terms of the expected equilibrium





The total expected default possible in the society, MeqΠ, can only be penalized
at a rate proportional to the number ν̄ of bureaucrats, and we set the meaning of
the technology parameter π in terms of the salary rate µ̄. ρD is an arbitrary scale
factor allowing Π and π to have the same dimensions, and assigning physical
meaning to penalties in terms of the discount horizon.
As in Ref. [10], we regularize the discontinuous derivative of the min func-
tions with Kuhn-Tucker multipliers ηi,t and η̄k,t respectively for specialists and
bureaucrats, both in the range [0,Π], and varied by an adversary to minimize
the constrained utilities. The initial (society) utilities of consumption, modified
by the constraints of cash payment and acceptance of the debt penalties, define
the utilities for agents as economic actors. With some algebraic condensation
to remove strategy-independent cancellations, these take the forms respectively
for producers and bureaucrats:

















































 ≡ Ūeconk,t .
(18)
5.3 Dimensional analysis
A complete listing of all variables and parameters is given as App. B, and the NE
for trade in the markets are derived in App. A, subordinate to the rules of the
buy/sell subgame, at general values of the parameters µ̄, τ , Π. The utilitarian
outcome of trade, as a function of these parameters, is then the input to the
labor-allocation decisions in the outer game. The existence and forms of interior
solutions for these two nested games will determine which tax rules permit the
size of government to be optimized endogenously.
We notice, however, that in the scaling limit of continuum trading, t0 ceases
to be a controlling parameter of the model, in which case there is a small sub-
set of parameters Υ, π, µ̄, and ρD, whose dimensions must determine those
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in the possible forms of solutions. There are additionally the numbers n of
agents and m of consumable goods, which become scale factors for permutation
symmetries25.
The combination of scale independence and a limited number of dimension-
carrying factors responsible for a set of phenomena opens the possibility of
predicting the sizes of observables that also carry dimension on the basis of
their dimensional content alone. The method, called dimensional analysis, is
often the first form of estimation of complex problems in the natural sciences,
because direct algebraic solutions are often not known, and one reliable con-
straint is that all equations must be homogeneous in dimension. The notion of
dimension is in some respects similar to that of fungibility, in that it is defined
by criteria of subsitutability. Dimensionality differs from fungibility in that the
subsitution relations are limited to those that do not depend on the scale of the
inputs or outputs; thus dimensionality entails a scaling invariance at least in the
measurement of the system, if not in its dynamics directly. There is no limit a
priori to the number of dimensions that may structure a problem, but whether
any exist at all does depend on the set of scale-invariant homogeneity require-
ments that can be imposed on equations. Thus in this problem utility, money,
time, and various types of goods have naturally assigned dimensions, and the
requirement of homogeneity in the algebraic solutions provides constraints on
the scales of the money supply or allocation variables, more general than the
algebraic solutions associated with particular choices of utility.
Using dimensional analysis, we predict here the scaling behavior and order
of magnitude of all relevant quantities, as a precursor to algebraic solution. For
simplicity we take s → 0 and omit gold from the goods space, as s is an addi-
tional nondimensional parameter that can correct any dimensional prediction.
Several limits in which gold behaves like an ordinary good are readily recov-
ered in the exact solutions. App. A verifies the dimension-driven predictions,
and adds corrections from dimensionless factors ρt0, ρD/∆, etc., which vanish
in continuum limits and at s → 0. A feature of the minimal models we have
introduced is that they require no additional dimension-carrying parameters,
with the consequence that the algebraic model solutions are exactly those of the
dimensional analysis.
5.3.1 Dimensions
We use square brackets around a variable to denote the name of its dimension.
For brevity we call the unit of time “days”, and the numéraire of fiat “dollars”.
In this notation [Υ] ≡ util26.
25In scaling limits n → ∞, m → ∞, we could have created a more elaborate dimensioning
in which n and m have units as well, but for this model the simpler dimensioning system and
use of symmetry will accomplish the same ends.
26An impediment to the use of dimensional analysis in neoclassical economics is an insistence
that utility be unmeasurable except as an ordinal relation. Any cardinal form, however,
operationally defines units for utility in terms of measurable actions, and it is necessary to
accept this and understand its consequences for scaling.
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Salaries have dimension [µ̄] ≡ dollar/day, which we will expand slightly
to say [µ̄] ≡ dollar/ (day · bureaucrat), treating the size of the bureaucracy as
a scaling variable. All pure rates in the problem have dimension [ρ] = [ρD] =
[∆] ≡ 1/day. We may distinguish ρ as defined by the rules of the game, from ρD,
a property of agent preferences, when asking which controls various quantities.
The penalties have dimension [Π] = [π] ≡ util/dollar. As Π is a derived
quantity, π is the dimensional controlling parameter.
5.3.2 Scaling predictions
We can now anticipate the scaling behavior of the two principle derived quan-
tities in this model: the money supply and the size of the bureaucracy. Di-
mensionally [M] ≡ dollar, and it must be determined from the parameters
specifying the game µ̄, π and the parameters of the macroeconomy ν̄, ρ. The

















On grounds of dimensional constraint we then expect the money supply to scale
as this combination, possibly by proportionality factors of order unity27. This
relation is denoted M ∼ µ̄ν̄/ρ. We note as a corollary that the velocity of money,
which is a rate and hence does depend on the trading period length (and not
on the discount horizon), should scale as M ∼ µ̄ν̄/ρt0. From the scaling of M
and Eq. (16) we obtain the scaling of Π, the micro-penalty variable, in terms of





As all agents and all goods are symmetric a priori with respect to permuta-








There is also a scaling for bids predicted from the dimensional content of pref-








At equilibria the microscopic penalties define the macroscopic rates of borrowing
and the global distribution of goods. Setting equal Eq. (21) and Eq. (22) we
27For example, algebraic relations such as first-order conditions potentially introduce fac-
tors of 2, and differential equations frequently produce factors of Euler’s constant or pi (the
constant), which appear as prefactors in scaling relations. While these are not predicted on
dimensional grounds by the scaling relations themselves, experience has shown that for struc-
turally simple equations they do not deviate by orders of magnitude from unity. Therefore the
scaling relations frequently also provide good predictions of quantity, to order of magnitude.
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The analysis we used to obtain Eq. (23) is more complex than needed, and
strictly should be corrected by arbitrary functions of the dimensionless ratio
ρ/ρD, by the assumptions we have stated. It could have been obtained directly
by recalling that a defining feature of fiat is its intrinsic valuelessness, outside the
scope of its rules, and the proposition of this model that the only purpose of the
rules is to facilitate as nearly optimal trade as possible. Thus, the scale of the
money supply is irrelevant to allocation of consumables, and the macroeconomic
parameter that controls it (ρ) is irrelevant as a scale-controlling variable. Then
Eq. (23) follows uniquely on dimensional grounds, up to the factor of m, which
we have not treated as a scaling variable with assigned dimensions.
Finally, we note the operational definition of the penalty technology and














/ (bureaucrat) . (24)
Default penalties are only meaningful in combination with the numéraire, and we
may think of Eq. (24) as the disutility rate associated (for example) with living
in debtor’s prison versus living free28. Then as ΥρD is a utility rate per agent
associated with ongoing rates of consumption, πµ̄/ΥρD has the interpretation
of a number of individuals who can be imprisoned per bureaucrat enforcing the
default laws, where the value measure of prison time per individual is expressed
in terms of the relative utilities of rates of consumption. The combination
πµ̄ν̄/ΥρD, a number of people the courts can maintain in debtor’s prison at
any time, is a stock variable, even though the utilities and disutilities associated
with the imprisoned states are properly defined in terms of utility rates.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Institutions, self-policing and Pareto optimality
The default and bankruptcy penalites of a society are variables in the long run,
but they are parameters from the viewpoint of enforcement. In an economy
with strategic agents and credit arrangements default may be an optimizing
choice if penalties are not sufficient. Without exogeneous uncertainty there
will always be a minimal default penalty that is sufficient to prevent strategic
default[16]. The enforcment of the rules concerning default come at a cost. A
reasonable way to consider the cost is that it involves primarily labor cost such
as those of judges, lawyers, accountants, bookkeepers and possibly police and
28Thus the rate-valued nature of the disutility of debtor’s prison is a consequence of the rate-
valued nature of living, and is properly comparable to other utilities of rates of consumption.
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others. The government bureaucracy has a production function which produces
enforcement. Given this institutional structure it is possible to define Pareto
optimality conventionally.
6.2 Coalitions, time and institutions
Much of economic and financial life involves decisions by groups of fiduciaries
running other peoples’ money. In formal cooperative game theory a coalition
is not an institution. It is an abstraction where communication and coordina-
tion is free. Here some stucture of government has been implicitly provided.
An individual who chooses to become a bureaucrat is assumed to enter into an
enforcement production structure that is implicitly given; the corporate coodi-
nation problem is assumed to have been solved. The output, however depends
on the number of bureaucrats recruited. In our analysis we have assumed that
enforcement depends in a linear manner on the number of bureaucrats. The
actual shape of the enforcement calls for empirical investigation and may differ
from country to country.
6.3 Finance and inequalities
In our investigation we have been concerned with both interior and boundary
solutions. A key feature in finance as contrasted with general equilibrium theory
is that cash flow constraints and credit matter. When there is not enough money
or credit, the cash flow constraints become binding.
6.4 The control problem
In essence, we suggest that the microeconomic abstraction of general equilib-
rium, which served as an excellent platform from which to study the static
existence of an efficient price system for nonstrategic agents is not adequate
to include the possibility of strategic agents. When strategic agents are con-
sidered the natural structure that supplants the n-person general equilibrium
model is the (n + 1)-person strategic market game, where the n + 1st player
is the government. It is large relative to the others. We attempt to provide
this enlarged model with minimal financial institutions. In doing so we observe
that the introduction of taxes, the rate of interest, government salaries, borrow-
ing and contract enforcement appear naturally as control variables. Thus the
embedding of a market system with strategic agents in a larger model which
provides enforcement and the possibility for coordination at a cost presents a
natural link between the microeconomic concerns with markets and price and
the macroeconomic concerns with money, coordination and control.
In macroeconomic analysis a distinction is often made between fiscal or mon-
etary policy. For may practical purposes the distinction is reasonably clear, but
if the cost of administration is significant and enforcement may be regarded as
a public good, pure monetary policy involves a fiscal component.
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6.5 Gross checks of the scaling estimates
Our models are chosen for minimality, not directly for quantitative prediction
in any particular economy. A check of the dimensional estimates of our primary
quantities, however, shows both that they are real and relevant observables
in the characterization of government and the macroeconomy, and that the
dimensionally induced estimates can be reasonable to order of magnitude.
Most immediately we consider Eq. (19) for the money supply. The size of
the federal bureaucracy in 2003 was ν̄ ≈ 2.7 million employees (SAUS 2003).
Supposing a bureaucrat’s salary to average µ̄ ≈ $40, 000 per year, and an av-
erage monetary rate of interest to be ρ ≈ 0.06 per year, gives an estimated
money supply of M ≈ $1.8 trillion. Estimated M1 in 2003 was $1.1 trillion,
for comparison. From Eq. (21) we may consider bm any individual’s spending
constraint at any time, as a share of the national limitation in the money sup-
ply (irrespective of how many effectively symmetric goods m it buys). For a
population of 288 million (SAUS 2003), and continuing within the dimensional
estimate for M, we obtain bm ≈ $6, 250, comparable to consumer credit limits
that for most Americans define their primary spending constraint.
The size of the bureaucracy itself is based on a more artificial construc-
tion (23) mediated by utility, but still one that can be given a pragmatic in-
terpretation. The combination ΥρD characterizes the change in the “rate” of
utility associated with changes in consumption by fractions29 ∼ 1/3, while liv-
ing otherwise free. In the spirit of the stylized model of government-imposed
disutility as confinement in debtor’s prison, if we consider a reduction by 1/3
in all m goods as characterizing the transition to starvation, we may as well
set ΥρDm as the disutility of consumption at which agents have nothing to
lose by being imprisoned. Then a pragmatic interpretaion of πµ̄ν̄ as the total
disutility imposable by the bureaucracy is that πµ̄/ΥρDm is the number of peo-
ple the bureaucracy can maintain in prison per bureaucrat employed. With a
total US bureaucracy (federal + state) ≈ 20.7million, and a prison population
≈ 1.3million, the ratio ΥρDm/πµ̄ ≈ 16. While neither the bureaucracy nor the
prison population is primarily concerned with default in these statistics, they
attach a number to the technology parameter which serves to define what one
means by it. By Eq. (23) we then estimate ν̄/n ≈ 16, a bureaucracy 16 times
the size of the society it serves.
While colorful metaphor, this illustrates the failure of scaling estimates, in
a way that can be traced explicitly to the assumption in Eq. (16) that the
bureaucracy stands ready to enforce penalties on default of the entire money
supply. Since at interior solutions none of the money supply is in default, the




where 0 < f ¿ 1 is the fraction the bureaucracy can enforce. With Eq. (25),
29taking 3 to approximate Euler’s constant e ≈ 2.718 for which ratio any logarithm in the









Taking actual ν̄/n ≈ 2.7million/288million ≈ 0.01 (federal bureaucracy per
population), we generate a value for f ≈ 1/1600.
6.6 Open problems
The scaling relations reified in this model provide no way to estimate a di-
mensionless fraction like f , and the main augmentation needed to estimate f
meaningfully is uncertainty leading to non-strategic default. Then f would arise
from the balance between discouraging strategic default and the support of trade
by moderating penalties on accident, in which legislation and lawyers enter as
essential new players. We leave this as an open problem at this time.
Two other problems are considered in a companion second essay. We inves-
tigate an economy that has a sufficiency of gold to use as its money. We observe
that if a loan market is not needed the Hahn Paradox is not encountered. We
consider the concept of efficiency under these circumstances.
Our last problem is to consider if it is feasible to construct a money-metric
to measure the relative efficiencies of different monetary systems.
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A Spot markets for gold and nondurable con-
sumables
Table 1 in App. B provides an index to the labor allocation and other variables
of the model, used in this appendix.
The variation in the allocation of good j to producer i resulting from the









































































































































































































































































































The variations in gi,t, ḡk,t, λi,t, and λ̄k,t are on unbounded intervals, so their








k,t), and we may also set λi,t = ρηi,t, λ̄k,t = ρη̄k,t









takes the boundary condition 0 for any good j, with the interpretation that
there is no wash selling in the private sector. Borrowed fiat is always better
used to bid on non-endowed goods, than to engage in wash selling, at a finite
rate of interest.
We look only for stationary solutions, symmetric under permutation of
agents of a given type, and under permutations of the types that produce non-
durable consumables. A reduced notation for offers is q0i,t ≡ q
σ for prospectors,
qji,t ≡ q for farmer i of good j, and zero otherwise. Bids b
j
i,t ≡ b0 from prospec-
tors on goods j ∈ 1, . . . ,m and zero otherwise, b0i,t ≡ b
σ from farmers on gold,
and bji,t ≡ b for farmer i on goods other than j ∈ 1, . . . ,m, and zero otherwise.
Bids from bureaucrats are b̄0k,t ≡ b̄
σ on gold, and b̄jk,t ≡ b̄ on all nondurable
goods. The K-T multiplier for default by prospectors is denoted ηi,t = η0, for
farmers it is ηi,t = η, and for bureaucrats η̄k,t = η̄. Finally, we denote ḡk,t ≡ ḡ
for stationary prospector borrowing, gi,t ≡ g0 for i a prospector, or gi,t ≡ g for
i a farmer.
Type symmetry presumes equal numbers of each type of farmer, which we




ν̄t ≡ mr̄, so that r
0 and r̄ are respectively the number of agents from each
replica who become prospectors and bureaucrats, and r0 + r̂ + r̄ ≡ r. Total
bids on gold are then denoted B0t ≡ B
σ = mr̂bσ + mr̄b̄σ, and on nondurables
Bjt ≡ B = mr
0b0 +(m − 1) r̂b+mr̄b̄. Offers of gold are Q
0
t ≡ Q
σ = mr0qσ, and
















The price of the nondurables j ∈ 1, . . . ,m is
pjt ≡ p =
B
Q














The final allocations of gold are denoted as the investments in capital stock
they produce: to prospectors A0i,t = e




and to bureaucrats Ā0k,t = b̄
σ/pσ ≡ σ̄. In stationary solutions the capital stock
itself has the value Ci,t = σ0/∆ for prospectors, Ci,t = σ/∆ for farmers, and
C̄k,t = σ̄/∆ for bureaucrats. The variations in utilities (31,32) involving Ci,t and
C̄k,t then reduce to forms equivalent to those from Cobb-Douglas preferences,
in which the exponent for all nondurable goods is αj = 1, j ∈ 1, . . . ,m, and for
investment in gold is
α0 =
sβ∆t0





In type-symmetric solutions, we introduce a condensed notation A0, A‖, A⊥, Ā
for the final allocation rates to different agents in their own or other types’
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consumable goods. Final allocations of nondurable goods to prospectors are
denoted




to farmer i of good j are
Aji t0 ≡ A‖t0 = at0 − q, (37)
and for farmers i of all types 6= j




Final allocation to all bureaucrats in nondurable goods is




A consequence of finite replication index r (together with finitely many goods
m+1) is that variations in agent bids and offers impact the prices at which the
goods on which they are bidding clear. Such “price impact factors” represent
finite-economy hoarding effects, and cause the NE of strategic market games to
differ from the CE at equivalent preferences, even in the absence of other ineffi-









t affecting consumption in Eq. (31,32). In
the interest of space we suppress these terms by considering the infinite-replica
limit r → ∞ (interior solutions have fixed r0/r and r̄/r in this limit), in which
they differ from unity by terms O (1/r) or smaller. The same limit removes the
term η̄k,t/ν̄t from Eq. (32) induced by the subsidy.






pσ (e0t0 − qσ)
= η0. (40)






= η0 (1 + τ + ρt0) . (41)






= η (1 + τ + ρt0) . (42)





p (at0 − q)
= η, (43)
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= η (1 + τ + ρt0) . (44)






= η̄ (1 + τ + ρt0) , (45)






= η̄ (1 + τ + ρt0) . (46)
A.1 Interior solutions
We consider here solutions in which the default constraint is tight but not vio-
lated. These are the solutions in the well-functioning economy where the laws
support trade without requiring agents to strategically violate them.
The one-period utilities of Eq. (3) for prospectors at r → ∞ stationary
solutions, in the reduced notation, are










while for farmers they are















The one-period utilities for bureaucrats in Eq. (4) are










The condition for an interior solution is that in the move where agents choose
livelihoods, there is no incentive to change from the current choice; thus Equa-
tions (47) - (49) must be equal.
Comparing Eq. (40) and Eq. (42) to Eq. (41) and Eq. (44), we find that
σ0/σ = (1 + τ + ρt0) b0/b = (1 + τ + ρt0) A0/A⊥. Similarly from Eq. (43) and
Eq. (44), A‖/A⊥ = (1 + τ + ρt0), and from Equations (42,45,44,46), we find
σ̄/σ = b̄σ/bσ = b̄/b. Thus the condition for neutrality between prospectors and
farmers is
(m + s) log
b0
b
= (1 − s) log (1 + τ + ρt0) , (50)
while the condition for neutrality between bureaucrats and farmers is
(m + s) log
b̄
b
= log (1 + τ + ρt0) . (51)
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A useful constraint of equal marginal utility from Eq. (42) and Eq. (44) gives
bσ/b = α0. Corollary relations of from the cash payment constraint are: mb0 =
g0,
(






b̄ = ḡ + µ̄t0.
The no-default condition for prospectors is that revenues must pay principle
and interest on borrowings, plus tax on total bids (which equal the amount
borrowed). Expressed as an inequality:























Farmers must pay taxes on bids and interest on borrowings (for which they
reclaim the principle spent on other farm goods through revenues from the
trading posts), plus the principle they bid for gold (which they do not recover),
out of revenues from bureaucrats and prospectors. As an inequality,








When the bound is tight, with Eq. (53), this reduces to
r̄b̄
r̂b
= (τ + ρt0)
[
(
α0 + m − 1
)
(1 + τ + ρt0) + α
0
m (1 + τ + ρt0) + α0
]
. (55)
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, reclaim taxes on their bids as part of revenue
from taxation, and must only pay principle and interest on borrowings out of
the taxes on private-sector bids (which consume all borrowings). The inequality
is














ρ (α0 + m)
·
(1 + ρt0) (τ + ρt0)
(1 + τ + ρt0)
. (57)




(1 + ρt0) (58)
For the purposes of this argument, it is sufficient to choose the tax law for
the convenience of its expression in terms of the population structure. From
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α0 + m − 1
)
(1 + τ + ρt0) + α
0
m (1 + τ + ρt0) + α0
]
. (59)
In Sec. A.3 we show that as ρt0 → 0, this form ensures stability arbitrarily close
to the no-default boundary.
Equality of all the no-default bounds gives allocations whose forms directly
















1 + τ + ρt0
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The relative amounts borrowed by different agent types also have direct








α0 + m − 1
)
1
(1 + ρt0) (1 + ρt0/τ)
, (62)








α0 + m − 1
)
, (63)
where we use Eq. (50) for b0/b.
A.2 Penalty scaling for interior solutions
Note that the money supply (58) is proportional to ν̄, and since the borrowing
and bids are comparable among all agents (at large m), the money supply per
agent is ∼ Meq/n. Hence the scale for the penalty ∼ ΠMeq/n ∼ ν̄/n.
Agents optimize toward tight bounds on default by reallocating labor in the
outer game into the private sector (in a sort of tatônnement to improve total
production), reducing the bureaucracy and hence the money supply, and driving
the K-T multipliers in equations (40 - 46) toward their limits Π. From Eq. (50)
and Eq. (51), the multipliers at any interior solution have ratios
η0
η̄









Hence either prospectors or farmers default first, and if we take s < 1 we may
make it the farmers, for convenience. Thus first default penalty is reached at
η = Π, giving the scale for the tax rate (evaluated at the interior function of
population structure) at first default,
(τ + ρt0)









An expression for the population structure at these solutions, not involving







α0 + m − 1
)
, (67)
which approaches r̄/ (r − r̄) at large m, by Eq. (63).
Alternatively, we can convert Eq. (67) to an expression for the sector bor-
rowing, expressed in terms of the self-consistently determined tax rule, in a form






















A.3 Stability of the labor allocation problem
We now ask what happens if Π is insufficient for Eq. (44) to hold b in the
no-default region, as a result of the labor allocation in the outer game. Since
this is known to all agents, we compute the optimal allocation in the regime
of strategic default by farmers, and we take as a bound the condition of no-
default for the other two types (even if they could improve utility slighty by
defaulting). As long as the no-default solution by bureaucrats is superior to
the default condition by farmers, a labor allocation that leads to default by
underpopulating the bureaucracy is not an optimum of the outer game. We
suppose that farmers deviated from the no-default condition by a small fraction
ε; specifically
b = (1 + τ + ρt0)
−1/(m+s)
b̄ (1 + ε) . (70)
Eq. (53) still holds, and the specialists can internally allocate r0/r̂ so that
b0/b satisfies Eq. (50). On this surface, the monetary amount of farmer default
is

















At the same time, the overall scale for borrowing is set by the bureaucrat no-





(1 + ρt0) (τ + ρt0)






Bureaucrats need only pay interest on borrowings, allowing them to escalate
the scale of bidding by 1/ρt0 relative to the degree of farmer default
30. From
the utilities (14,15), with the former only in default, the penalty definition (16)
and equilibrium money supply (58), and approximating log (1 + ε) ≈ ε, the
approximate utility difference resulting from farmer-only default is
Ui,econ/Υ − Ūk,econ/Υ ≈ ε













Using πµ̄/ΥρD to approximate the tax function at first default through Eq. (66),
we simplify Eq. (73) to
Ui,econ/Υ − Ūk,econ/Υ ≈ ε

















At nonzero ρt0, for r̄ < r̂, there is generally a range of ε > 0 for which
farmers benefit from excess consumption, inducing strategic default and with
it defection from bureaucracy to the private sector in the outer optimization,
relative to ε = 0. However, τ and the equilibrium allocation change only by
O(ε) from equilibrium values, and Π not at all under these rules. Meanwhile,
at any nonzero ε there is a bound on ρt0 below which Eq. (74) is clearly zero or
negative, making farmers worse off by default than non-defaulting bureaucrats,
who in turn are not optimizing by an allowed default of their own that would
reclaim some consumption ∝ ε. When farmers are worse off, the equilibrium
of the outer game has population allocation closer to the interior (no-default)
solution. Thus at sufficiently small ρt0 we may place the equilibrium of labor
allocation arbitrarily close to the no-default boundary, and ε ∝ ρt0 → 0 in the
continuum trading limit.
Details aside, the reason this tax law creates a stable solution with nonzero
bureaucracy is that bureaucrats reclaim the (finite) taxes on their own bids, and
need pay only interest on borrowing, while specialists in the private sector pay
a fraction of the money supply per period in taxes. The leveraging effect when
the velocity of money is large (finite Mt at ρt0 → 0) makes it impossible for
specialists to gain a large advantage on bureaucrats, even though a linear default
penalty is strictly a protection relative to suffering the concave disutility of
decreased consumption, because bureaucrats can always ultimately out-borrow
specialists at a comparable or lesser penalty.
30Note that when this bid-up is severe, Π will also be insufficient to prevent bureaucrat
default. The point is that the amount they borrow in a default equilibrium is only O(ε) larger
than the no-default limit that is our bound.
30
B Definition and condensed notation for vari-
ables and parameters
Notation used in the paper.
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Figure 1: Qualitative features of the transition to specialization represent re-
gions in strategy space, not sensitive to perturbations in preference represen-
tation. Convex preferences in two goods are represented here by solid lines.
Possible endowments achievable within the generalist or specialist production
technologies represented as shaded regions with dashed boundaries. Solid dots
are outcomes realizable by certain combinations of production decision and trade
technology, and open circles are reference points in the analysis. A is the best
outcome one can achieve as a generalist, and B the (Pareto-inferior) best out-
come as a specialist without trade. B
′
is the endowment that produces a best
outcome (C) with the NE of some trading game, and D for reference is the
CE at the same endowments. Utility in money-metric, measured by integration
along the Pareto Set (diagonal dashed line) [9, 10], defines a natural measure of
the relative commodity value of the different outcomes. The value of C (open
circle on the Pareto set indifferent to C) stably dominates A but is dominated
by D, capturing the gains to trade as well as inefficiencies associated with finite
population size. (Other inefficiencies associated with costs of markets not shown
in this figure, for simplicity.) In minimal models the endowment difference be-
tween B and B
′
is suppressed, as it depends sensitively on representations of
both utility and specialist production at small arguments.
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Parameters
m Number of types of consumption goods
n ≡ mr Number of agents in the society
t0 Time interval for a cycle of production, trade, and consumption
a Allocation rate of consumption goods to farmers
e0 Allocation rate of gold to prospectors
µ̄ Bureaucrat salary rate
π Penalty technology of the bureaucracy
∆ Rate of decay of capital stock
ρ Rate of interest on borrowing
τ Fraction of gross receipts from sales demanded in taxes
Υ Scale factor for utilities
ρD Temporal utility discount rate
β Per-period discount fraction
Labor, price, and allocation variables (period notation → stationary notation)
ν0t → mr
0 Number of prospectors at any time t
νjt → r̂ Number of farmers of any consumption good at any time t
ν̄t → mr̄ Number of bureaucrats at any time t
Qjt → Q Total quantity offered of a single consumable
Q0t → Q
σ Total quantity of gold offered
Bjt → B Total fiat bid on a single consumable
B0t → B
σ Total fiat bid on gold
pjt → p Price of any consumption good at any time t
p0t → p
σ Price of gold at any time t
λ, λ̄, η, η̄ Kuhn-Tucker multipliers
Aji,t → A0 Prospector’s final allocation rate of any consumption good
Aji,t → A‖ Farmer’s final allocation rate of self-produced consumption good
Aji,t → A⊥ Farmer’s final allocation rate of other-produced consumption good
Ājk,t → Ā Bureaucrat’s final allocation rate of consumption good
A0i,t → σ0 Prospector’s final allocation rate of gold in each period
A0i,t → σ Farmer’s final allocation rate of gold in each period
Ā0k,t → σ̄ Bureaucrat’s final allocation rate of gold in each period
Ci,t → σ0/∆ Capital stock of prospectors
Ci,t → σ/∆ Capital stock of farmers
C̄k,t → σ̄/∆ Capital stock of bureaucrats
Individual decision variables(period notation → stationary notation)
q0i,t → q
σ Gold offered by any prospector per period
qji,t → q Self-produced consumption good offered by any farmer per period
gi,t → g0 Borrowing by a prospector per period
gi,t → g Borrowing by a farmer per period
ḡk,t → ḡ Borrowing by a bureaucrat per period
bji,t → b0 Bid by prospector on any consumption good
b0i,t → b
σ Bid by any farmer on gold
bji,t → b Bid by any farmer on any other-produced consumption good
b̄0k,t → b̄
σ Bid by any bureaucrat on gold
b̄jk,t → b̄ Bid by any bureaucrat on any consumable good
Table 1: Reduced notation for the decision, price, and allocation variables of
the fiat economy in case of stationary solutions.
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